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Abstract 
This article examines the 2019 European Parliament election in the United Kingdom. The main 
beneficiaries were the newly formed Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats, both of which 
ran on clear Brexit platforms, while the Conservatives and Labour struggled to attract support. 
But the Brexit focus of the campaign – and the victory of parties with clear positions on these 
issues – belied the extent to which the election conformed to the expectations of second-order 
contest theory, with low turnout, declining support for the governing (Conservative) party, a 
surge in support for new and small parties, and scant discussion of EU-level issues. While the 
vote shows realignment in the UK continues and can tell us much about the shifting politics of 
Brexit, we should be cautious inferring much from the victory of the Brexit Party and the 
Liberal Democrats given the second-order nature of the contest. 
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Introduction 
The 2019 European election in the United Kingdom (UK) was significant in a number of 
respects. It was the election that weren’t supposed to take place, held at the last-minute after 
Theresa May was forced to request an extension to the Brexit process from the European Union 
(EU), and the very act of voting symbolised the travels of Britain’s efforts to withdraw from 
the Union. It was also never going to be the most consequential election, since British MEPs 
would not hold onto their seats for very long, meaning citizens were taking part in an election 
with rather insignificant consequences for their own lives. And the vote took place against the 
backdrop of major social and political upheaval in the UK, as the failed attempts to pass the 
Withdrawal Agreement highlighted the extent of Parliamentary deadlock as well as the 
continued salience of Brexit divisions among UK citizens, and led to a protracted period of 
crisis in the British state over how to proceed. 
Unsurprisingly Brexit dominated the election campaign, and the results indicated that parties 
with unambiguous positions on Brexit performed best. The Brexit Party, which favoured a no 
deal Brexit, was the surprise winner of the popular vote and obtained the greatest number of 
MEPs, followed by the Liberal Democrats – who had campaigned on an anti-Brexit platform 
– in second place. The Conservatives and Labour, in contrast, were both punished by voters, 
and both mainstream parties saw their support decline precipitously. The Conservatives lost 
support among Leave supporters to the Brexit Party, many of whom had previously defected 
to UKIP in the 2014 European election, and lost support in affluent and Remain supporting 
areas to the Liberal Democrats. Labour lost support among Remainers to both the Liberal 
Democrats and the Greens and from Leave-supporters to the Brexit Party. The election resulted 
in a decisive blow to the governing Conservatives, significant increase in support for those 
smaller parties with clear positions on Brexit, and a considerable decline overall in the 
proportion of votes going to the traditional two parties. 
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Both the results and the campaign in the UK suggest that European Parliament elections 
continue to fit the second-order contest model, which predicts that national votes lacking in 
salience and consequence will be marked by low turnout, declining support for the governing 
party, greater vote share for new and smaller parties and the dominance of national issues in 
the campaign. The 2019 European election exhibits all of these characteristics, with turnout 
systematically lower than in national elections, shrinking support for the governing 
Conservative party, a significant boost in the fortunes of small parties and new entrants (the 
Brexit Party and Liberal Democrats), and a focus on Brexit and the legitimacy of the EU as a 
polity rather than on European issues per se. While this follows a pattern established by the 
2014 elections, the salience of Brexit, the background condition of domestic political crisis and 
the fact British MEPs would not be sitting for long all reinforced the sense in which the 2019 
election would end up looking like a proxy vote on a national issue. 
The lessons for British politics from the 2019 European elections, such as they are, must be 
tempered by the fact that the vote accorded closely with the logic of second-order contests, 
although this does not mean the vote did not highlight important trends. Certainly the victory 
of the Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats does not signal any profound or long-lasting 
demise in the vote-share of the dominant Conservative and Labour parties, which dominated 
the vote-share in the 2017 and 2019 general elections. And the Brexit Party’s decline in the 
2019 general election shows that the party struggles to break into Westminster and continues 
to rely on threatening the vote-share of other parties to influence the agenda. But the 2019 
European election does exhibit evolving trends in British politics, namely the changing politics 
of Brexit post-referendum – which look very different in mid-2019 than in mid-2017 – and the 
continuing process of political realignment which has seen Labour lose support in its industrial 
heartlands and the Conservatives lose support in wealthy areas in the southeast. 
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This article discusses these key aspects of the 2019 European elections, focusing in turn on the 
post-referendum context of the vote, the results of the main actors in British politics, whether 
the elections conform to the oft-cited second-order contest model, and the lessons that can be 
learned about the evolution of British politics after Brexit. 
 
Post-Referendum Elections in the United Kingdom 
In the few years since the June 2016 referendum in which the British electorate voted to leave 
the EU, UK citizens have taken part in three national-level votes: two general elections (June 
2017 and December 2019) and the European Parliament elections in May 2019. Unsurprisingly, 
each of these votes has been heavily influenced by the result of the 2016 vote, even if indirectly. 
The then prime minister David Cameron had intended the referendum as a means of managing 
divisions on the Europe question within the Conservative party (Copsey and Haughton, 2014). 
Following the victory of the Leave campaign, Cameron’s replacement as leader, Theresa May, 
vowed that her government would act on the Brexit mandate and that the UK would indeed 
leave the EU as promised (Allen, 2018: 107). Concerned, however, about conducting 
negotiations with the small parliamentary majority she had inherited from Cameron and buoyed 
by poll ratings which showed her a popular leader, May called a general election on 8 June 
2017. May hoped the election would increase her leverage vis-à-vis the EU as well as her 
domestic detractors, but instead the vote resulted – after a disastrous campaign – in the loss of 
the Conservatives’ parliamentary majority. While both mainstream parties performed well 
relative to smaller parties, the anticipated Conservative vote failed to materialise, forcing May 
into a confidence-and-supply arrangement with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), a small, 
territorially-based party from Northern Ireland which had supported Brexit and was associated 
with a socially conservative agenda and a desire to keep Northern Ireland in lock-step with the 
5 
 
UK. The 2017 general election left its mark on May’s tenure and her conduct of the Brexit 
negotiations. Without a parliamentary majority, the EU did not trust May could deliver the 
support at home for any agreement. Moreover, her reliance on the DUP pushed Brexit in a 
politically problematic direction, since the party would not countenance any special status for 
Northern Ireland. Defectors from within her own party, smelling blood, stepped up their 
criticism of the prime minister. 
In the end, May’s failure to pass the negotiated Withdrawal Agreement on two successive 
occasions in early 2019 (15 January and 12 March) forced the prime minister to request from 
the European Council an extension to the two-year timeframe specified by Article 50 for 
negotiating an agreement on the terms of British withdrawal. The extension, offered up to 31 
October 2019, was a compromise from Brussels, and came at the price of British participation 
in the upcoming elections to the European parliament, scheduled for May 2019. Thus, against 
the backdrop of a domestic crisis which occasioned the three-time failure of the Withdrawal 
Agreement, on 23 May British citizens took part in elections for the European Parliament. The 
election was symbolic in two respects. First, its effects would not last long, since British MEPs 
would lose their role upon the completion of Brexit. And second, the election wasn’t supposed 
to have taken place, given May had promised to complete Brexit by 31 March 2019. To call 
the resulting Conservative performance disastrous would be an understatement: The party 
polled 8.8% of the popular vote – an historic low even by the standards of European Parliament 
elections – losing out to the newly-founded Brexit party and the pro-Remain Liberal 
Democrats. The Labour party performed poorly too, on 13.6% of the vote, just above the 
Greens. Not only did the results cast May in poor light as a leader, they also showed that the 
party was still highly vulnerable on the right, given the success of the Brexit Party and its 
programme of opposition to May’s agreement.  With last-minute efforts to reach across the 
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parliamentary divide rebuffed, May was forced to concede that she was unable to deliver 
Brexit, and agreed to step down as leader once a successor had been chosen. 
The incoming prime minister, Boris Johnson, had been widely tipped as future Conservative 
leader and had contributed in no small part to May’s downfall through his opposition to the 
negotiated agreement. After seeing off contenders in a party leadership election, in which the 
candidates vied to portray themselves in as Eurosceptic a light as possible, Johnson set about 
renegotiating the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement. Johnson received few concessions from 
the EU, but did succeed in obtaining Brussels’ support for revised customs arrangements for 
Northern Ireland and unilaterally removed the ‘level playing field’ requirements from the 
appended Political Declaration. Whether because the deal was better, or because the 
Eurosceptic critics had been brought into the tent, Johnson succeeded in October 2019 in 
passing the Withdrawal Agreement, but failed to obtain parliamentary support for his proposed 
timeframe (The Guardian, 2019b). Seeking to improve his situation in parliament, and 
capitalise on his approval ratings, Johnson called for a general election, which took place on 
12 December 2019, with the Conservatives running on the slogan ‘Get Brexit Done’ and with 
Johnson having removed the whip from outspoken pro-Remain Conservative MPs (Alexandre-
Collier, 2020). The election resulted in a decisive win for the Conservative party, which 
obtained a majority of 80 seats, many of which it won from working-class Labour 
constituencies – the so-called ‘red wall’ – which had previously been considered safe (Curtice, 
2020). Labour performed poorly compared to 2017, with critics blaming their disassociation 
from their working-class base and confusion surrounding their message on Brexit (Cutts et al., 
2020). Anticipated gains for the Liberal Democrats also failed to materialise, while the Brexit 
Party saw its support drain away to the Conservatives, though the party chose not to stand 
against defending Conservative MPs (Sloman, 2020: 35). Key to the Conservatives’ victory 
was uniting the Leave vote, with three in four Leavers voting Conservative compared to the 
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plurality of Remainers who opted for Labour (Curtice, 2020: 11). The vote paved the way for 
the relatively smooth passage of the Withdrawal Agreement in Parliament in December 2019 
and for the UK to leave the EU on 31 January 2020. 
 
The 2019 European Parliament Election in the UK 
The European Parliament elections cannot be understood outside of the immediate context of 
Brexit, which can explain why the UK was taking part, motivated the emergence of the Brexit 
Party, determined to a considerable extent the pattern of voting, and – in turn – went on to 
influence the outcome of the Brexit process. This section considers the results of the vote in 
more detail, with subsequent sections comparing the results to those of the two post-Brexit 
general elections and assessing the lessons for British politics which emerge in light of this 
comparison. 
The results of the European Parliament election was a surprise for many, even at a time in 
British politics where seemingly long-held trends had been overturned with relative ease. The 
newly-founded Brexit Party received a plurality of the vote with 30.5%, followed by the Liberal 
Democrats on 19.6%, the opposition Labour Party with 13.6%, the Greens on 11.8%, and the 
governing Conservatives with 8.8% (Cutts et al., 2019: 497) (see Figure One). By way of 
comparison with the previous European Parliament election, the Brexit Party performed 
somewhat better than UKIP had in 2014 (both served as similar vehicles for Eurosceptic 
protest) while both Labour and the Conservatives fared far worse. In 2014 UKIP had received 
26.6% of the vote, whereas the Brexit Party in 2019 gained 30.5%. Meanwhile, Labour and the 
Conservatives had, between them, obtained 47.5% of the vote in 2014, with this figure reduced 
to 22.4% by 2019, a decline of over 50% of the 2014 amount. The Liberal Democrats (on 
19.6%) and the Greens (on 11.8%) also performed well, especially relative to their vote-shares 
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in previous elections, while the SNP (on 2.6%) obtained a similar share of the vote to its 
performance in 2017, down somewhat from the impressive performance at the 2015 general 
election (Agnew, 2018; Curtice, 2018). 
The Conservatives deliberately chose not to campaign vociferously, aware that the election 
highlighted their failure to deliver Brexit as promised, and the party’s vote share of 8.8% was 
the lowest it had ever polled in a national election (Curtice, 2019). According to polling by 
Ashcroft, Conservative support was fairly equally split between Leave and Remain supporters. 
The same study suggests that over half of voters (53%) in the European Parliament election 
who had voted for the Conservatives in June 2017 defected to the Brexit Party (Ashcroft, 2019). 
By early-2019 it had become clear to many Eurosceptics that May’s vision for the UK’s post-
Brexit relationship with the EU – enshrined in her failed Withdrawal Agreement and the 
‘Chequers Proposal’ – was not as strident as the prime minister’s Eurosceptic rhetoric had made 
out (Brusenbauch Meislova, 2019). Brexit Party supporters, who were by mid-2019 more 
supportive of ‘no deal’ than previously (Kettell and Kerr, forthcoming) clearly did not find it 
an attractive proposition to support May’s agreement, which had been negotiated with the EU 
under an intense asymmetry in bargaining power (Hix, 2018; Martill and Staiger, forthcoming). 
The party also lost a smaller proportion of their support (12%) to the Liberal Democrats. 
According to Cutts et al. (2019: 513) it is the defection of Remain-supporting former 
Conservative voters to the Liberal Democrats, especially in affluent areas in the southeast, 
which decimated the Conservative vote-share compared to the 2014 European election, since 
Eurosceptic Conservatives had already defected (to UKIP) in 2014. The Conservatives’ poor 
showing resulted from the fact that, having failed to convince former UKIP voters to support 
the party, they had alienated affluent pro-Remain supporters in the process, many of whom 
switched to the Liberal Democrats (Cutts et al., 2019: 513).  
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Labour also performed poorly in May 2019 relative to its vote-share in the 2017 general 
election and its performance in the 2014 European Parliament election, receiving just 13.6% 
of the vote, compared to 24.4% in 2014. The party’s campaign focused on the need for greater 
public investment, and effort tackling inequalities and combating climate change (BBC News, 
2019b) and did its best to direct the discussion away from Brexit, on which the party was highly 
divided: At the end of April the conflict came to a head, and the party agreed to support a 
second referendum ‘with caveats’ (BBC News, 2019a), but deliberately avoided making this 
the cornerstone of their campaign. ‘Strategic ambiguity’ had arguably helped the party to 
achieve a substantial – if insufficient – share of the vote in the 2017 general election, but by 
the time of the European elections the party was finding it more difficult to appease both sides 
of the debate (Cutts et al., 2019: 509). Squaring the Brexit circle was especially difficult for 
Labour since over two-thirds of their support came from Remainers (Ashcroft, 2019; Lynch 
and Whitaker, 2017) but a majority of seats they held were in areas which voted to Leave 
(estimated at 64% of the party’s seats held prior to the 2017 general election) (Hanretty, 2017: 
477). The difficulties associated with Labour’s Brexit position meant the party lost Leave-
supporting voters to the Brexit Party, especially in areas where fewer voters held higher 
educational qualifications (Cutts et al., 2019: 512), but also that it failed to hold onto some of 
the gains it had made among younger voters in the 2017 general election, many of whom in 
Remain-supporting constituencies switched to the Liberal Democrats (Cutts et al., 2019: 509). 
According to the Ashcroft poll, 22% of Labour voters in the 2017 general election opted for 
the Liberal Democrats in May 2019, 17% voted for the Greens, and 13% defected to the Brexit 
Party (Ashcroft, 2019). 
Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party was the greatest beneficiary of the elections, receiving a plurality 
of votes (30.5%), making them the winner by a considerable margin. The party had been 
formed only in November 2018 and so fresh was the outfit that it did not have a manifesto 
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prepared in time for the elections, instead running on the promise of a Brexit on ‘WTO terms’ 
(that is, essentially, a ‘no deal’ scenario). The party aimed to capitalise on May’s seeming 
inability to deliver Brexit, as well as hardening anti-EU sentiment among Leavers (Staiger et 
al., 2019), many of whom regarded Brussels as deploying bullying tactics in the negotiations.  
Indeed, polls showed that the party obtained over half (64%) of the Leave vote, whereas the 
Remain vote had been far more fragmented. Unsurprisingly, a significant majority of those 
voting for the party (91%) had voted Leave in the referendum (Ashcroft, 2019). The Brexit 
Party targeted regions where UKIP had been successful before, and according to district-level 
data performed strongly in areas where support for Brexit was high, including in eastern 
England, the East Midlands, and Wales, and performed poorly in London and Scotland, where 
it received on average under 20% of the vote (Cutts et al., 2019: 500-501). The party drew 
considerable support among Leavers away from both the Conservatives and Labour, although 
there was a strong correlation between those who had supported UKIP in 2014 and voted for 
the Brexit Party in 2019, meaning the party did not win over many Conservatives who had not 
previously defected (Cutts et al., 2019: 505). 67% of Brexit Party voters in May 2019 indicated 
they had voted Conservative in the June 2017 general election, and 14% said they had voted 
Labour (Ashcroft, 2019). 
The main loser on the right was UKIP, led by Gerard Batten, which obtained 3.3% of the vote, 
receiving no MEPs. Since the referendum vote, the party had lost much of its raison d’etre, as 
the single issue on which it was campaigning had been decided, its enigmatic leader had 
departed, and the Conservatives under May had adopted a more Eurosceptic rhetoric (Evans 
and Mellon, 2019: 84). The result was that “the decision to leave the EU had shot UKIP’s fox” 
(Cowley and Kavanagh, 2018: 424). While subsequently Farage’s Brexit Party appeared well 
placed to capitalise on opposition to May’s deal, by this point UKIP had become a more 
socially conservative and, according to some observers, anti-Islamic party. Interestingly, and 
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perhaps because of this shift to the socially-conservative right, much of the UKIP vote in May 
2019 was new, with the majority of UKIP voters from 2017 (68%) having defected to the Brexit 
Party, and only 32% of UKIP voters in May 2019 having voted for the same party in the 2017 
general election (Ashcroft, 2019). 
The second largest number of MEPs was gained by the Liberal Democrats – “a party with a 
commitment to the EU in its DNA” (Oliver, 2015: 414) – which campaigned on an explicitly 
anti-Brexit platform and support for a ‘People’s Vote’ – a second referendum. The party 
obtained 19.6% of the popular vote, polling around two-thirds of the level of Brexit Party 
support, representing an increase of 13 percentage points on its performance in the previous 
European elections (6.61%) and around 12 percentage points on its performance in the last 
general election (7.4%). The vast majority of Liberal Democrat voters (88%) had voted to 
Remain in the 2016 referendum, and the party obtained the support of 36% of those who had 
voted Remain in 2016, although this vote was more fragmented than the Leave vote, with a 
considerable proportion voting Labour (19%) and Green (19%) (Ashcroft, 2019). The party 
performed well in affluent areas of the southeast of England, where there was strong support 
for Remain in the referendum, including the south-west of London (where the party had 
traditionally performed well), taking votes from the Conservatives in these areas in particular. 
Correspondingly, the party performed poorly in the West Midlands and eastern England, where 
support for Brexit was higher (Cutts et al., 2019: 501).  The party’s stance on Brexit drew in 
supporters from both Labour and the Conservatives who were disenchanted by the policies of 
these parties, which were both officially pro-Brexit and also much more ambiguous (Sloman, 
2020: 39). It also benefited from its pre-existing support in affluent pro-Remain areas, a 
tradition of strong grass-roots organisation, and by the fact it was no-longer associated with the 
baggage of governing, as it had been in the 2015 general election. 
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The Greens – co-led by Jonathan Bartley and Sian Berry in the campaign – polled well (11.8%), 
especially in Remain supporting areas (Cutts et al., 2019: 501), and increased their vote share 
by just over four percentage points, although the Liberal Democrats achieved almost double 
the Greens’ vote share in contrast to 2014 when the Greens had narrowly edged out the (then 
governing) Liberal Democrats. The Greens polled especially well in majority Remain-
supporting areas in the south-west and performed poorly in Leave-supporting regions on the 
east coast (Cutts et al., 2019: 501). Almost half of the Greens’ vote-share (48%) came from 
those who had voted Labour in June 2017, and a significant majority (78%) had voted Remain 
in 2016 (Ashcroft, 2019). The other party seeking to capitalise on the votes of Remain 
supporters, Change UK – founded by ten Labour and three Conservative refugees – performed 
poorly and received no seats. Among other reasons, the party suffered from poor branding and 
frequent changes of name even in the run-up to the election, the absence of a significant 
organisational basis, no history of prior identification with voters (which the Brexit Party 
lacked also, but Farage himself did not), numerous competitors for Remain votes with clearer 
Brexit positions, and the association of its key personalities with mainstream parties which also 
performed poorly. 
 
Still a Second Order National Contest? 
Placing the 2019 elections in context and comparing the results with both the 2014 European 
Parliament elections and the two most recent general elections (2017 and 2019) can help us to 
understand the place of European elections within the UK and, most importantly, whether they 
still fit the oft-quoted model of second-order national contests. 
Second-order contest theory posits that sub-national and trans-national elections are often 
qualitatively different from national elections – which “decide who is in power and what 
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policies are pursued” – because there is less at stake for citizens in the vote (Schmitt, 2005: 
651), meaning voters tend to use such occasions to punish their governing parties on national 
issues (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Second-order contests are thus distinct in a number of respects: 
turnout tends to be far lower than at national elections, the governing party usually loses 
support relative to previous (and successive) national elections, contests tend to be fought on 
national issues rather than local or European ones, and larger parties generally lose out to 
smaller or newer competitors. Over the years successive studies have claimed that European 
Parliament elections fit the second-order contest model well (Schmitt, 2005; Hix and Marsh, 
2011), with low turnout, a missing link between the election and executive control, domestic 
issues dominating in the campaigns and evidence of anti-incumbent voting patterns offered as 
reasons (Corbett, 2014: 1194). Even as the Parliament has become a more significant institution 
within the Union, and as the set of EU competences has expanded, European Parliament 
elections seem to accord with this model (Marsh, 1998; Schmitt, 2005: 668), although there is 
some recent evidence this might be changing as the link between citizens and the EU becomes 
more politicised (e.g. Corbett, 2014; Galpin and Trenz, 2019). 
Do the results of the 2019 European election in the UK accord with the expectations of second-
order contest theory? The question is an important one, since it helps us understand whether 
the elections fit the pattern of prevailing European Parliament elections, whether these elections 
are themselves the subject of qualitative change – as some authors have argued – and, finally, 
how relevant the 2019 European election in the UK is as an indicator of change in British 
politics. The remainder of this section examines this claim in relation to each of the scholarly 
criteria used to establish whether an election can be considered a second-order contest. It 
suggests that, despite a few minor deviations from the mould, the 2019 European Parliament 
election fits the definition of a second-order contest reasonably accurately. 
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One key indicator of second-order status is that turnout tends to be lower than in national 
elections (Schmitt, 2005: 651). Because the elections don’t result in the formation of any 
government, they are considered less important than national elections (Hix and Marsh, 2011: 
5). Certainly this appears to have been the case with the 2019 European Parliament election. 
According to polling by Ipsos Mori (2019), while 86% of respondents surveyed prior to the 
2017 general election said the result was either ‘very important’ or ‘fairly important’, only 61% 
of respondents said this was the case for the 2019 European election. Turnout was 
correspondingly low at 37%, though not unprecedentedly so. Indeed, this figure was similar to 
turnout in the 2014 European Parliament election (35.6%) but lower than in national elections 
held in 2015 (66.9%), 2017 (69.3%) and 2019 (67.3%). It was also far lower than the turnout 
for the 2016 referendum which had witnessed such high turnout (72.2%) that much of the 
polling data were inaccurate as a result. As Figure Two makes clear, turnout in European 
Parliament elections remains systematically lower than in national votes. This is in spite of the 
salience of Brexit in British politics at the time and widely held claims that the vote would 
amount to a second referendum on the Brexit issue (The Guardian 2019a). If this was to be a 
proxy referendum, it was not one being held on the same terms – or with the same electorate – 
as in 2016. Moreover, turnout was skewed towards Remain supporters, who, keen to have their 
say, voted in larger numbers than Leave-supporters, who felt disenchanted and were tired of 
voting repeatedly for the Brexit option (Cutts et al., 2019: 502-503). 
Another criterion of second-order contests is that governing parties tend to perform poorly, 
since “voters use [them] as a low-cost opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with 
government parties”, meaning they are prone to decrease their support in the second-order 
contest but subsequently regain this in the subsequent first-order election (Schmitt, 2005: 651). 
Instead, voters are more likely to “support opposition, small and new parties to the detriment 
of parties in national government” when voting in second-order contests (Schakel, 2015: 636). 
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Generally speaking the results of the 2019 European election, especially in the context of the 
2017 and 2019 general elections, supports this hypothesis. The ruling Conservatives received 
a moderate share of the vote in June 2017, declined precipitously in May 2019 in the European 
election, and subsequently increased their vote share in December 2019, such that they could 
obtain a sizable majority in the latter election. Two caveats are worth noting here, however. 
The first is that the Conservatives fought the 2019 general election on a more Eurosceptic 
platform under Johnson than May had fought the previous election, suggesting the vote was 
not a like-for-like comparison. The second is that voters deserted both of the major parties in 
May 2019 and the Labour opposition did not accrue support from voters’ decision to punish 
the Conservatives. These caveats do not disprove the hypothesis that the governing party was 
punished, but suggests there was more to the result than simply a desire to punish the 
Conservatives for poor governance. 
A related aspect of second-order contests – which helps explain this aspect of the result – is 
that larger parties tend to poll poorly relative to their size, and “small parties do relatively better 
compared to first-order election results” (Schmitt, 2005: 652). A related claim has it that new 
parties, rather than simply smaller ones, are likely to poll better (Schakel, 2015: 636).1 In the 
UK case this is reinforced by the significant divergence in proportionality between the First 
Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system used in elections to Westminster and the closed-list 
proportional system used in European Parliament elections, which encourages voting for 
smaller parties. The results of the 2019 European Parliament elections in the UK would seem 
to support this claim. Both of the main beneficiaries of the vote were small parties relative to 
the number of seats they held in the British Parliament: Eight seats for the Liberal Democrats 
and no seats for the Brexit Party. The Greens also polled well for a party with only one MP in 
                                                 
1 The claim that new and small parties perform better than their larger counterparts is distinct from the claim that 
governing parties lose out, since established parties often form the official opposition and since governing parties 
– especially junior coalition partners – may often be relatively small. 
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Westminster. While the Liberal Democrats are an established small party (with roots dating 
back to the Liberal party of the 19th century) and while the Greens trace their history to the 
environmental movements of the 1970s, the Brexit Party had been in existence as a formal 
entity only since November 2018. Given the scale of the collapse in Labour’s vote share in 
addition to the Conservatives, it is perhaps more plausible to see in the 2019 European election 
mainstream decline rather than punishment of the governing party per se. 
Finally, it is claimed that European elections are second-order because they are fought on 
domestic issues, where “the situation in the first-order arena, that is, the national arena, 
determines EP elections” (Adam and Maier, 2011: 434). They are “fought in the shadow of the 
contest for the main (first-order) national election by the same parties as contest national 
elections, with a subsequent focus on the national arena rather than European level issues” (Hix 
and Marsh, 2011: 5). Here the record is more complex, but generally still accords with sceptical 
accounts of the efficacy of European elections. The campaign in the UK was dominated by 
Brexit, although some parties – notably Labour – tried to steer the conversation towards other 
domestic issues where they felt more comfortable. While Brexit made the EU the subject of 
the election, however, this did not translate into any sustained discussion of the EU policy 
agenda, of the vision of the major political groupings at the EU level, or the future direction of 
the EU’s political system. Whether the focus on the EU was derivative of domestic 
preoccupations with Brexit and the EU (e.g. De Vries et al., 2011: 17; Hix and Marsh, 2011: 
5) or was part of a broader shift towards European Parliament elections as ‘first order polity 
elections’ where the EU’s legitimacy is itself the subject (Galpin and Trenz 2019) is academic 
in the UK context, since the root cause – British Euroscepticism and the Brexit vote – was 
essentially the same. Whether or not we regard the 2019 European election in the UK as a first-
order contest over EU legitimacy or a second-order contest deriving from the salience of this 
question in British politics, we are forced to accept that the focus on ‘Europe’ as an issue does 
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not equate to the emergence of genuine contestation over the direction of the EU agenda, but 
rather derives from the salience of the EU membership question in the UK. 
In a number of respects, then, the 2019 European Parliament election results confirm the 
expectations of second-order contest theory; turnout remains lower than in national elections, 
the governing party received a significant (but temporary) decline in support, larger and more 
traditional parties lost out to smaller and newer competitors, and engagement with European 
issues was thin on the ground, even though the question of Britain’s EU membership dominated 
the campaign. Of course, the correspondence between the 2019 European election and the 
assumptions of second-order contest theory leaves some questions unanswered. It is not clear, 
for instance, whether the Conservative party’s significant losses were a product of desires to 
punish the governing party or whether they were part of the broader decline of the political 
mainstream. It is also unclear whether voters were seeking to punish established parties for 
their positions on Brexit (with a view to supporting them subsequently) or whether they simply 
preferred alternative parties from a programmatic point of view. And, as always with UK 
elections to the European Parliament, it is unclear how much of the variation in vote share 
between the major parties is a product of the second-order nature of the election or the use of 
an electoral system which produces such distinct results to that used for elections to 
Westminster. 
The distinct circumstances surrounding the vote in 2019 likely reinforced the odds it would 
approximate a second-order contest. To begin with, there was far less at stake than usual, since 
elected British MEPs would not sit for the duration of the 2019-24 Parliament and would – it 
was believed at the time – be out in any case by October, prior to the inception of the new 
Commission. (In the end, British MEPs sat until 31 January 2020). Moreover, the election took 
place against the backdrop of a national crisis precipitated, in no small part, by the governing 
Conservative party, as May’s efforts to pass her negotiated Withdrawal Agreement failed in 
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the British Parliament – a record defeat – and as it appeared there was no simple way out of 
the impasse. Then there was the symbolic content of the election for both Remain and Leave 
supporters. Many of the former had been agitating for a second referendum in order to voice 
their displeasure over the government’s Brexit course, and the European elections provided an 
important avenue for this. Leave supporters, meanwhile, regarded the fact the election itself 
was having to take place as an affront, making a protest vote more likely. Finally, one might 
point to the clarity of positions on Brexit offered by small and challenger parties – in this case 
the Brexit Party and Liberal Democrat positions – when compared with the confusion of 
mainstream (Conservative and Labour) positions as a facilitating condition for mainstream 
decline. In short, the 2019 European elections were especially prone to being treated by voters 
as a second-order contest. 
 
The European Election and British Politics 
Understanding the 2019 European election in the UK as redolent of second-order election 
theory helps us to place the election in context and to understand its significance (or, to some 
extent, non-significance) as a forebearer of future trends in British politics. Broadly speaking 
the lesson to be drawn from the largely second-order nature of this election is to moderate the 
findings for British politics more generally that we can draw from this example, since many of 
the ostensibly surprising trends are entirely predictable according to the logic of second-order 
theory, and most of the observed changes did not outlast the subsequent first-order election in 
December 2019. Four supposed trends are worth revisiting in light of the 2019 European 
election and our knowledge of how the results differed from the general elections in June 2017 
and December 2019: (a) the demise of multi-party politics, (b) the salience of Brexit, (c) the 
rise of populism, and (d) the change in political alignments. 
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Can the May 2019 election tell us anything about changes in the British party system? One 
discernible finding from the 2017 general election, according to a number of analysts, was a 
reversal of the trend towards a more diffuse party-system in the UK, given the strong 
performance of the Conservatives and Labour and the weaker polling of the SNP, UKIP and 
Liberal Democrats relative to previous elections (Curtice, 2017; Heath and Goodwin, 2017; 
Johnston et al., 2018: 179; Prosser, 2018). Yet come the May 2019 European election the 
Liberal Democrats polled extraordinarily well, as indeed did the Brexit party, and both larger 
parties lost out, leading to some expectations among politicians that the mainstream parties 
might not fare as well as in 2019 as they had in 2017 (Sloman, 2020: 40). In line with the 
expectations of second-order theory, however, the December 2019 results proved a boon for 
the governing Conservative party, while Labour increased its vote share significantly relative 
to the May 2019 European Parliament election (though declined relative to the 2017 general 
election). The vote-share of the two main parties, at 75.8%, was not significantly below the 
82.2% figure from 2017. The SNP also performed well within Scotland, but their vote share 
remains small and geographically concentrated on a number of marginal constituencies. Liberal 
Democrat gains were not forthcoming, and the party kept the same number of seats, though it 
did draw some support away from Labour (Curtice, 2020: 11).2 Comparing the European 
elections to the general elections suggests that the major parties appear to have, by and large, 
maintained their grip on the UK party system, even as their smaller competitors have sought to 
capitalise on the salience of Brexit and difficulties the major parties have faced in articulating 
coherent positions. In short, the 2019 European election does not herald a return to multiparty 
politics, but is better understood as a typical second-order protest vote. 
                                                 
2 British politics is replete with examples where the Liberal Democrats have been predicted significant – and 
game-changing gains – only for these to be dashed on election day, with recent examples in 2010, 2017 and 2019 
(Parry and Richardson, 2011; Prosser, 2018: 1228; Sloman, 2020). 
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Then there are the politics of Brexit. After the referendum it was suggested that Brexit might 
fundamentally alter the fault-lines of British politics. The 2017 general election was billed as a 
Brexit election, but voting patterns in the end fell principally along socio-economic lines and 
parties running on pro/anti Brexit programmes fared poorly, confounding expectations (Hobolt, 
2018: 39).3 Both the May 2019 and December 2019 elections saw campaigns that were far 
more focused on Brexit than the 2017 general election, even though they were further from the 
referendum vote. The December 2019 general election was fought by the (victorious) 
Conservatives under the banner ‘Get Brexit Done’. How to explain the changing status of 
Brexit over time? A number of changes between 2017 and 2019 suggest themselves. First, the 
pursuit of Brexit had become a domestic crisis by 2019, creating space for a debate about the 
best way to proceed. May’s interpretation of the Brexit mandate, and her strategy, were both 
delegitimised by early 2019. While anti-Brexit Conservatives used the 2017 election result to 
lobby for a softer Brexit (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2018: 426), Leave-supporters drew the 
opposite lesson and augured for a tougher position under a more Eurosceptic leader. Second, 
preferences hardened on both sides relative to 2017; Remain-supporters called for a second 
referendum with increasing confidence (e.g. Bellamy, 2019), while support for a ‘no deal’ 
Brexit gradually became the dominant position within the Leave camp (Kettell and Kerr, 
forthcoming; Staiger et al., 2019).4 In the immediate aftermath of the referendum positions had, 
surprisingly, been more moderate: Many Leavers spoke about the benefits of the ‘Norway 
model’, while Remain supporters acted, on the whole, as ‘graceful losers’ (Nadeau et al., 
forthcoming) and Remain-mobilisation was initially low (Davidson, 2017). Third, political 
                                                 
3 Voting on Brexit lines was partly occluded by the lack of supply from the major parties, both of which were pro-
Brexit (Hobolt and Rodon, 2020: 240). But other factors were at play, too, including the media’s focus on domestic 
issues, May’s refusal to fully articulate her own Brexit position (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2018: 425-426), and the 
fact that voters placed the EU behind both the NHS and the cost of living when asked what mattered to them and 
their families (Ashcroft, 2017: 58-60). 
4 By mid-August 2019, according to YouGov (2019), 80% of Leave-supporters declared they would prefer a no 
deal Brexit to a scenario in which Jeremy Corbyn would become prime minister. 
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parties began to shift their own positions over the course of 2018-19: The Conservatives spoke 
more favourably of ‘no deal’ under Johnson, Labour flirted with the idea of a second 
referendum and eventually adopted it, the Brexit Party set out a harder stance than had UKIP 
– which had not supported a no deal Brexit – and the Liberal Democrats moved from promising 
a second referendum to promising a revocation of Article 50. 
The 2019 European Parliament elections were also notable insofar as they signalled, for many 
analysts, the rise of populism as a (more) significant force in European politics (e.g. Napierala, 
2019; Servent, 2019; Treib, forthcoming). Did the ascendency of the Brexit Party in the 2019 
European election in the UK herald such a rise in British politics? To be sure, within much of 
the pro-Brexit rhetoric could easily be found populist tropes: the construction of an undivided 
British ‘people’, and the identification of their ‘elitist’ enemies and external threats (Freeden, 
2016; Wilson, 2017). And certainly there are linkages between Farage’s brand of 
Euroscepticism and populism, what Tournier-Sol (2015) had described as UKIP’s ‘winning 
formula’. But the Brexit Party’s success must be put into context. To begin with, the party’s 
performance differs little from the situation in the 2009 European Parliament election in which 
UKIP capitalised on Eurosceptic sentiment to gain a plurality of popular support but failed to 
translate these gains into seats in the British Parliament. Most importantly, the Brexit Party did 
not keep their supporters, who voted in droves for the Conservative Party in the 2019 general 
election. Why they did so is overdetermined: Johnson’s conservatives adopted much of their 
Brexit rhetoric, Farage stood down his candidates in Conservative-held seats, and the electoral 
system prevented the Brexit Party from translating votes into seats. Thus, the rise and fall of 
the Brexit Party tells us something about the surface resilience of the UK system to insurgent 
parties, as well as its subtler vulnerability. While these parties find it exceedingly difficult to 
break into Westminster politics, even with considerable popular support, they are able to exert 
considerable influence by threatening the major parties’ vote-share in marginal constituencies. 
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The 2019 European election was not a turning point for populism in the UK, but rather showed 
once again how such ideologies have gained a foothold in the system in recent years. 
Finally there is the question of political realignment in the UK, which has been a topic of 
sustained debate in British politics for a number of years, reflecting broader observations on 
the rise of new cleavages in European politics, notably between younger and older voters and 
the winners and losers from globalization (e.g. Azmanova, 2011).  The 2017 general election 
showed considerable evidence of political realignment, with the Conservative party gaining 
support in de-industrialised areas where Labour had previously polled well, and Labour picking 
up support in cosmopolitan areas “more strongly connected to global growth” (Jennings and 
Stoker, 2017: 359). Similar trends were evident in the 2019 European election, albeit occluded 
at times by the surge in support for the Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats. Conservative 
support held up in deprived areas, but the party lost votes to the Liberal Democrats in more 
affluent constituencies, many Brexit Party supporters having already defected to vote UKIP 
(Cutts et al., 2019: 505-507). Labour lost support to the Brexit Party in deprived areas and 
among the white working class, and to other parties in areas with a younger vote (Cutts et al., 
2019: 510). In the December 2019 general election the Conservatives managed to unite Leave 
voters who had voted for other parties in the European Parliament election, helping to secure 
their substantial victory, but again lost support to the Liberal Democrats in more affluent and 
Remain-supporting areas (Curtice, 2020: 11). The 2019 European election thus illustrates a 
broader pattern of realignment in which the Conservatives have occupied space in Labour’s 
heartlands which the latter party had taken for granted for a number of years, albeit that this 
support mainly went to the Brexit Party in May 2019 before going over to the Conservatives 
in December 2019 (Cutts et al., 2020: 8-10). 
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Conclusion 
This article has examined the 2019 European Parliament elections in the UK. The elections 
were significant insofar as they symbolised the failure of the Brexit process to be secured by 
the stated deadline, saw British MEPs elected for a significantly truncated tenure, and took 
place against the backdrop of considerable political upheaval in the UK. The results showed 
that Brexit remained a key issue for voters and that mainstream parties could not be 
complacent: The front-runners were both parties with strong views on Brexit – the Brexit Party 
and the Liberal Democrats – while the Conservatives and Labour polled poorly even for a 
European election. The results suggest that European elections in the UK continue to fit the 
expectations of second-order contest theory, with low turnout, declining support for the 
governing Conservatives (which would later be regained), rising vote-shared of smaller and 
newer parties, and a preoccupation with the national debate on Brexit rather than on issues at 
the EU level. We thus need to treat any lessons from the vote for British politics with due 
caution, given that the May 2019 result cannot be equated with a UK general election. While 
changes in the discourse surrounding Brexit and patterns of underlying political realignment 
are indeed suggestive of ongoing trends in British politics, the surge in support for the Brexit 
Party and the Liberal Democrats are better understood as products of second-order contests 
rather than as decisive shifts in the UK party system. 
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Figure One: Proportion of the popular vote received by parties in the UK in national and European 
elections, 2014-19 (Data from Electoral Commission (2019a, 2019b, 2019c) and Cutts et al. (2019). 
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Figure Two: Turnout (%) in national elections and referendums in the UK, 2014-
19 (Data from Electoral Commission (2019b, 2019c) and Cutts et al. (2019). 
 
